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RECENT DECISIONS
Community Property

Divorce ture of a Military Retirement Fund
-

The Community Na-

Gilberto Mora sued for divorce from Flora Mae Mora after fourteen
years of marriage. At the time of trial Gilberto, a member of the armed
forces for twenty-five years, was eligible for retirement. On the basis of
his service he was to receive upon retirement a monthly income for life;
the retirement plan provided that Gilberto would forfeit his rights to such
income if he died while in the service or was dishonorably discharged. The
trial court concluded that this retirement fund was not the community
property of the spouses. Held, reversed: A husband's interest in a military
retirement plan is a presently vested property right, regardless of the forfeiture clause, and that portion of the retirement fund accumulated during the marriage constitutes community property of the spouses. Mora v.
Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error dismissed w.o.j.
which
Earlier Texas cases recognized the conflict between jurisdictions
considered retirement or pension funds a gift from the employer to the
employee upon retirement and jurisdictions which considered such funds
1
a type of compensation earned during the period of employment. The
Texas courts came to the conclusion that the fund represented property
earned by the employee during the period of employment.! Under article

4619' such funds were then classified as community property of the
spouses.
In recent years in Texas a conflict focused on whether a forfeiture clause
in the retirement fund agreement denied the employee a vested property
right in the fund. If the forfeiture clause were a condition precedent, no
property rights would vest in the employee prior to his retirement,' and
thus no community property rights would arise prior to retirement. But if
the clause were a condition subsequent, a vested property right would arise
in the money accumulated in the retirement fund; the employee would
have a vested interest subject to divestment, and this interest would constitute community property acquired at the time an amount of money was
placed in the fund and credited to the employee.
In Mora the San Antonio court of civil appeals took the position that a
forfeiture clause was a condition subsequent, for "[o]nly rights in existence can be forfeited." The court stated that no federal statute or regulation divested it of power to make necessary orders "affecting the retire'Lee v. Lee, 112 Tex. 392, 247 S.W. 828 (1923); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960); McCamey v. Hollister Oil Co., 241 S.W. 689 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), aff'd, 115
Tex. 49, 274 S.W. 652 (1925).
'See Herring v. Blakely, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965), noted in 19 Sw L.J. 370 (1965);
Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
xTm.
Rv. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 4619 (1960) provides that all property acquired during

marriage except by gift, devise or descent shall be community property.
4See A. CosBri, CoNTRAcTs § 628 (1952).
5
id.
6429 S.W.2d at 662.
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ment benefit as part of the property settlement in a divorce action."' The
situation in Mora was contrasted with the situation in Allen v. Allen,'

where the court was deprived of this power by federal statute.
From the express language in such retirement plans, the agreement contemplates that the employee has a property right in the fund and that his
right may be lost, forfeited, or divested if the employee performs some
specified act in the future. From the standpoints of equity and the wording of the majority of forfeiture clauses in retirement plan agreements, an
employee's interest in such funds should be regarded as a vested right subject to divestment and, therefore, as the community property of the
spouses prior to retirement. The problem the courts must now resolve is
how to divide this interest upon divorce when the employee will not receive any income from the fund until some future date.'

T.W.W.

Constitutional Law - Juvenile Proceedings -

Due Proc-

ess for the Delinquent
The Juvenile Court of Harris County, Texas, found the defendant,
Debra Fay Leach, aged twelve, to be a delinquent child.' The charge of
delinquency was based on the fact that she had run away from her home
on several occasions. Debra Fay had been placed in the detention ward of
the juvenile authorities at the request of her parents and had remained
there until trial. During her incarceration, and before counsel was appointed for her, Debra Fay was interrogated by a probation officer. The
child was not told of her right to have an attorney with her during these
questioning periods, nor was she told of her right to remain silent. At trial
the interrogating officer testified, on the basis of Debra Fay's statements,
that the child was "endangering her morals by the runaways and what
took place during the runaways."' Held, reversed: Proceedings in juvenile
cases which may lead to commitment must meet the requirements of due
process, including written notice of the specific charge, notification to the
child and his parents of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them (or appointed), and application of the constitutional priv' 63 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
'In Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), the court affirmed the
trial court's allowance of a money judgment against the husband for the wife's share of the retirement fund, although the husband had no present right to income from the fund. In the instant case
the court noted that the trial court could enter a decree requiring the husband to pay the wife a
share of the monthly payments "if, as, and when he receives them." 429 S.W.2d at 663. Because
such retirement funds often constitute substantially all the assets of a married couple, this latter
approach appears to be the more equitable.
ITEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, S 3(f) (Supp. 1967), providing that a child may be
delinquent when he "habitually deports himself so as to injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others."
'Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. 1968).
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ilege against self-incrimination. Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1968).
In determining specifically that the interrogation and testimony of the
probation officer denied Debra Fay the constitutional essentials of due
process, the court applied the standards established in In re Gault.' There,
the United States Supreme Court decided that the same principles applicable to adults in criminal proceedings must be enforced in cases involving
juveniles, even if the proceedings are before a juvenile court and only de-

termine the status of "delinquency." The Court stated that such proceedings, "which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the
feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings."
The statute under which Debra Fay Leach was committed was part of
the Civil Statutes of Texas.' Courts have traditionally used a different
standard of due process in "civil" proceedings under the theory of parens
patriae,"or the philosophy that juvenile proceedings are not "in the nature
of a criminal trial, but constitute merely a civil inquiry ...

looking to the

treatment, reformation, and rehabilitation of the minor child."' One inroad toward recognizing the need for constitutional protection in a juvenile proceeding was the Supreme Court's decision in Kent v. United
States," which held that "assistance of counsel was essential to the validity
of a transfer of jurisdiction by a juvenile court to a district court."' The
Texas court in Leach acknowledged that all the safeguards essential to due
process in!a criminal trial are required in a juvenile proceeding, and found
them lacking in this case. The testimony of the probation officer should
have been excluded from the proceedings on the basis that "[i]nculpatory
admissions made prior to a waiver of the privilege against self -incrimination, or opinions based thereon, are not admissible."' 0 In addition, because
no counsel was timely appointed to safeguard appellant's rights and because the child was not warned of her constitutional privileges, the court
felt that the proceedings constituted "clear violations of federal due process."' 1 So holding, the court implicitly recognized that the delinquency
statute is penal in nature and, thus, must be treated as penal in its enforcement.
R.A.K.
'387 U.S. 1 .(1967), noted in 28 LA. L. REV. 492 (1968), and 47 NEB. L. REv. 558 (1968).
4387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
5 See note 1 supra. A concurring opinion preferred to base the decision on the "obvious unconstitutionality of that portion of the statute here in issue." 428 S.W.2d at 821.
e Sovereign power guardianship over persons under disability. For a general discussion, see Note,
Criminal Procedure--Due Process in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 28 LA. L. REV. 492 (1968).
'In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954). The court went on to say: "Their
purpose is not penal but protective---aimed to check juvenile delinquency" and to protect a potential criminal during his adolescent life. Id.
8383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'Note, supra note 6, at 495.
10428 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex. 1968). The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11428 S.W.2d at 821. The court noted, id. at 820, that according to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
36 (1967),
child."

"(A] probation officer is also an arresting officer and cannot act as counsel for the
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Stockholder's inspection Rights ,ditional State Right Enforced by Federal Court

Tra-

After the corporation repeatedly refused to grant Stern his stockholder's right to inspect corporate books and records, Stern brought suit' in
federal district court' in Pennsylvania, the state of incorporation, requesting an order to permit inspection. The inspection right was authorized
by a Pennsylvania statute.' The district court dismissed the action on the
ground that because the relief sought was mandamus, the court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction under the All Writs Act.' The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.' Held, reversed: A federal district court has jurisdiction to grant equity relief in a diversity action by a
stockholder against a corporation, where the stockholder seeks to inspect
the corporate books and records as authorized by state statute, even where
such state statute is labeled "mandamus." Stern v. South Chester Tube Co.,
390 U.S. 606 (1968).
At common law a stockholder was entitled to inspect the books and
records of a private corporation at a reasonable time and place, and for a
proper purpose.' Enforcement of this inspection right was generally accomplished by mandamus.' In the instant case, both lower courts interpreted the relief sought by Stern as in the nature of mandamus. A line of
cases holding that the All Writs Act denied jurisdictional power to federal
courts to issue mandamus where it was the only relief sought led the two
courts to conclude that they were denied such power in the present case.
The Supreme Court viewed Stern's complaint as basically one seeking
equitable relief and not mandamus. In concluding that the lower courts
erred in interpreting the nature of the relief sought, the Court distinguished most of the cases relied upon as suits against a public official,
whereas the present case involved a private party. The Supreme Court
found only one prior case, Knapp v. Lake Shore R.R.,s in which it had held
a federal court without jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against
a private party. But the Court distinguished Knapp on the ground that it
was a suit at law in which mandamus was expressly sought and which was
brought at a time when law and equity were divided. Because mandamus
was restricted to actions at law, the Knapp court was unable to grant such
relief. The subsequent merger of law and equity eliminated this limitation
'Stern was a resident of New York and held $10,000 or more of stock; South Chester Tube
Company was incorporated in Pennsylvania--thus federal court original jurisdiction was invoked
under 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a) (1964), where diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy
in excess of $10,000 were both met.

'Stern v. South Chester Tube Co., 252 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, S 2852-308B (1958).
428 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964). Federal courts are authorized to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
' 378 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1967).
6 18 C.J.S. Corporations S 502 (1939); W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2214 (perm.
rev. repl. 1967).
718 Am. JuR. 2D Corporations §§ 444-49 (1965); W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, 5 2251. Mandamus is a writ issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction and directed to a person, officer,
corporation, or inferior court, commanding performance of some particular duty resting on the
person to whom it is sent. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus §§ 1, 2 (1939).
s197 U.S. $36 (1905).
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on the federal court's power to grant equitable relief. Pennsylvania statutes
set out both the stockholders' right to request inspection of the books and

records. and the right of state courts to issue a compulsory judicial order
for enforcing such rights. The Supreme Court felt that the Pennsylvania
statutory relief, although labeled "mandamus," was actually equitable in
nature. The Court reasoned that since Stern had no adequate remedy at
law, a federal court could have jurisdiction to grant the relief sought
under its equity power. The issue of whether such result would be obtained even if there were no similar state remedy in statutory form was expressly avoided.
By the Stern decision, the Supreme Court has recognized the jurisdictional power of federal courts to grant equitable relief to stockholders in
a diversity action where rights of inspection are refused by the corporation,
in the event that state statutory provisions authorize such relief. Stern
makes available an old remedy in a new forum. It is not a surprising decision, because it complements an established structure of federal regulation
of various corporate activities."
T.E.S.

Jurisdiction Partner

Foreign Corporation Doing Business as a

Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he was a passenger
collided with a truck driven by an employee of a partnership doing business in Odessa, Texas. After moving from Texas to Ohio, plaintiff sued
Freedom Newspapers, Inc., a California corporation and controlling partner in the Odessa partnership, for damages resulting from the accident.
The suit was brought in an Ohio federal district court, where jurisdiction
was based upon diversity of citizenship. Freedom Newspapers moved for
a change of venue to a Texas federal district court, alleging that the Texas
court was the proper venue,' and that personal jurisdiction over Freedom
Newspapers could be obtained pursuant to the Texas long-arm statute.!
Held, motion granted: Owning a controlling interest in a Texas partnership constitutes sufficient contact with Texas to subject the non-resident
partner to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts. Myers v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
Historically, jurisdiction over foreign corporations was determined by
9PA. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 2852-308B (1958).

'oId. tit. 12, S 1911 (1967).
" See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, SECUrITIEs LAW (1967), for a discussion of federal regulation of
fraud in the securities field.
t28 U.S.C. S 1391 (a)

(Supp. 11, 1965-66): "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded

only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." See also id.
1391 (c) for venue in a suit against a corporation.
'Tax. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN.art. 2031b (1964).
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such tests as corporate presence and corporate consent.! However, in the
landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,' the Supreme

Court discarded previous jurisdictional tests and established a less restrictive
standard. To be amenable to service under this test, a foreign corporation
need only have "certain minimum contacts" with the state so that the ex-

ercise of jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.4 In formulating the "minimum contacts" standard, the
Court focused on the necessity of balancing the interests of the plaintiff,
defendant corporation, and the forum state.! Once due process limits are
defined, a state must still enact a "long-arm" statute authorizing "minimum contacts" jurisdiction." The applicable Texas statute' provides that
if a foreign corporation fails to appoint a resident agent, the Secretary of
State may be served as the agent of the foreign corporation whenever the
foreign corporation is "doing business" in Texas. This statute was designed

to exploit maximum jurisdictional rights consistent with the Federal Constitution."5
"Minimum contacts" litigation involving a corporate partner operating
a partnership in another state has been sparse. This is probably due to the
fact that until recently many corporations were statutorily forbidden
partnership status." Furthermore, even when authorized by statute, the
right of a corporation to be a partner was very restricted, often depending on the charter of the corporation."2 Other related partnership situations
have been litigated to a greater degree. In Schenstrom v. Continental Machines, Inc.,"3 a federal district court held that a corporation was not "doing
business" in a foreign state merely because it owned an interest in a sep-

arately operated partnership located in the forum. It is significant to note
that jurisdiction was refused even though the separately owned partnership was completely dominated by the foreign corporation.

Although for jurisdictional purposes individuals and corporations cannot always be treated alike, ' the "minimum contacts" jurisdictional test is
clearly applicable to both non-resident individuals and corporations.' Thus,
"See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4
See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). See also Note, The
Application of the First Amendment to Long Arm Jurisdiction, 21 Sw. L.J. 808 (1967).
5 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
eld. at 316.
'F. JAMEs, CvrL PROCEDURE 640 (1965).
'Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cit. 1966). See generally
VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 155 (1967).
9
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, S 4 (1964). The Secretary of State can be served as
the agent of the foreign corporation whenever the foreign corporation is doing business in Texas,
defined to include: (1) "entering into contract . . . with a resident of Texas to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in this State," (2) "the committing of any tort in whole or in
part" in Texas, or (3) any other act which "may constitute doing business."
5
eAtwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966).
1
" See, e.g., Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
"aSee, e.g., Mervyn Inv. Co. v. Biber, 184 Cal. 637, 194 P. 1037 (1921); Consolidated Furniture Mfrs. v. Goldstein, 140 Cal. App. 563, 35 P.2d 627 (1934); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Strauss,
243 S.W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
137 F.R.D. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
" E.g., a corporation is subject to suit in the state of its incorporation, even though it may not
be engaged in business or carrying on any activities there.
'McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
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cases dealing with jurisdiction over out-of-state individual partners have
some bearing on whether an out-of-state corporate partner should be subject to the jurisdiction of a particular state. For example, in Bedford v.
Dillinger" "minimum contacts" were satisfied solely because the nonresident individual defendants were partners in a Texas partnership, even
though they were not physically present within the state." In Stoner v.
Higginson' service upon an individual non-resident defendant was upheld
because the defendant's partnership was engaged in business in the jurisdiction at the time service was made.
The threshold question in Myers was whether the Texas court could obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant foreign corporation based
solely upon its partnership interest-activity. The defendant was not conducting its primary business in Texas; thus, jurisdiction had to be based
on its partnership interest. The court determined that the defendant's
partnership, which it controlled, was sufficient business activity within the
state to satisfy the requirements of due process. Applying traditional partnership principles, the court reasoned that the corporation was doing business in Texas because each partner acts as the agent of the other and the
activities of one are imputed to all.
Myers v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., seems to exemplify the steadily expanding jurisdiction over foreign corporations, evidenced by broader constitutional decisions and implemented by far-reaching long-arm statutes.
It is unclear, however, whether the decision in Myers can be extended to
other situations involving out-of-state corporations. In reaching its decision, the court in dicta reiterated the rule of Cannon Mfrs. v. Cudahy
Packing Co.,"' which holds that the ownership of a foreign subsidiary is not,
in itself, sufficient contact with that state to subject the parent corporation to jurisdiction therein.' From an academic viewpoint, it might be
urged that this distinction should be discarded. If the Myers situation constitutes sufficient contact with a foreign state, the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign parent corporation whose only contact with the forum state
is the ownership of a subsidiary therein seems equally reasonable. However,
it is unlikely that this will become the law in the near future, for historical
precedent, which dictates that corporations and partnerships should be
treated differently for jurisdictional purposes because shareholders, unlike
partners, have limited personal liability, will be difficult to overcome.
A.W.Z.
310 F.2d J83 (5th Cir. 1962).
The partnership agreement provided for payment of certain commissions to a partner. The
former partner, suing for commissions, was allowed to acquire jurisdiction over non-resident former
partners by citation upon the Secretary of State of Texas, where the non-resident partners actually
participated in the partnership business in the state.
1"

1.316

Pa. 481, 175 A. 127 (1934).

19267 U.S. 333 (1925).

In Cannon the substantive issue did not arise out of the activities of

the subsidiary.
" Cases subsequent to Cannon have maintained that when a separate corporate identity is not
retained the parent is subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign state. See, e.g., Skupski v. Western
Navigation Corp., 123 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Spacarb, Inc. v. Automatic Canteen Co.,
101 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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Labor Law

-

Life of Grievance Procedure After Contract

Termination
The union notified Kingsport Publishing Corporation that it was unequivocally terminating the labor agreement at the contract termination
date. Some eight months after the contract expired, and during negotiations with the union for a new agreement, the company discharged a union
employee for refusal to carry out a foreman's instructions. The union
sought to initiate grievance proceedings as set out in the expired contract.
Kingsport refused to follow this grievance machinery, but exhibited a
willingness to pursue the matter in negotiations. The union declined to negotiate and filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board under section 8 (a) 5'of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board determined that because grievance handling is a mandatory subject of bargaining,' the company was guilty of an unfair labor practice by
reason of its unilateral action and petitioned the court for enforcement of
its order so holding. Held, enforcement refused: Kingsport had a right to
decline to follow the previous grievance procedure where the prior union
agreement had expired, negotiations for a new contract had not been
concluded, and the grievance procedure had not become a part of the established operational pattern. Kingsport Publishing Co. v. NLRB, 69
L.R.R.M. 2193 (6th Cir. 1968).
That grievance procedure is a mandatory subject of bargaining is well
established,3 and the facts in Kingsport reflected the company's willingness to negotiate on this matter. Therefore, the point of contention centered around the availability to either party of unilateral change or unilateral action concerning a grievance.
In NLRB v. Katz" the Supreme Court held that "an employer's unilateral
change in conditions of employment under negotiation is ... a violation of
Section 8 (a) 5."' The Board has further pronounced that employment practices of the employer may become conditions of employment and, as such,
may survive the termination of an agreement." In Kingsport the union and
the Board, following the dictates of Katz, maintained that a unilateral
change in a mandatorily bargainable item was automatically a violation of
section 8 (a) 5.
The company based its defense upon two theories. The first was that the
union termination letter exceeded section 8 (d)' requirements and constituted a waiver of their right to bargain about any change regarding a condition of employment. The court disposed of this argument as being unnec' 29 U.S.C. § 1$8 (a) 5 (1964): "'It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-to refuse
"
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Marine Workers Union
v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).

3 ld.

'NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
3Id. at 743.
eShell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 283 (1964)
tenance work on a unilateral basis).
129 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1964).

(the practice of contracting out occasional main-
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essary to a decision. The second company defense centered upon the premise that grievance machinery is based upon contract. Since no contract existed, the company urged that no grievance machinery was in effect. This
theory was based on J. Wiley & Sons,' which declared that arbitration was
a contractual matter and that the company could not be compelled to arbitrate where it was not bound by an arbitration agreement. Because arbitration was the final step in the grievance process which the union insisted upon, the company argued that it could not be required to go
through grievance procedure. The court, recognizing the contractual basis
of arbitration, nevertheless did not base its decision on the second contention of the company.
The Kingsport court followed the reasoning of an Eighth Circuit decision, NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp.,' where it was held: "Expired contract rights affecting mandatory bargaining issues, therefore, have no efficacy unless the rights have become a part of the established operational pattern and thus become a part of the status quo of the entire plant operation."'" The Sixth Circuit in Kingsport reasoned that the expiration of
eight months without a single grievance, being processed through the previously existing machinery was sufficient for a finding that such machinery
was not a part of the "established operational pattern."
By refusing enforcement of the Board's order the court has given additional instruction to the Board in its dealings with the effect of contract
provisions in expired labor agreements. This instruction should strengthen
the rights of parties to an expired labor agreement to disregard provisions
set out in such agreement, even though mandatorily bargainable, where the
provisions can be shown not to be a part of the status quo of the plant
operation.
R.B.S.

Labor Law
Checkoff

-

Remedies

-

Order to Employer To Grant

The National Labor Relations Board found that H. K. Porter Company
had violated section 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act' by
failing to bargain in good faith with the union on the issue of a checkoff
provision. The Board ordered the company to bargain collectively" and the
court of appeals enforced the order,8 indicating that the company would
not be permitted to refuse a checkoff provision "for some concocted rea'John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
'NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1967).

'Old.at 981.
149 Stat. 451 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(5) (1964).
' 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965).
aUnited Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 295 (D.C. Ci.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
851

(1966).
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son not heretofore advanced."' The union and the company disagreed as
to the interpretation of the circuit court's decree of enforcement. While
the union interpreted the decree as obligating the company to agree to a
dues-checkoff provision, the company felt that it was required only to discuss the possibility of such a provision. In spite of these divergent interpretations the court denied a union motion to clarify the decree for the purpose of inviting the Board to test the competing ideas with further investigation.' The Board accepted the arguments of the company and declined
to institute contempt proceedings. The union again asked the circuit court
to clarify its enforcement decree. The subsequent clarification and remand
of the case to the Board for further proceedings indicated that the Board
would be warranted in ordering the company to grant the checkoff provision "in return for a reasonable concession by the union. ' " Held, supplemental order issued: An order obligating the employer to grant checkoff
but not requiring the union to give a reasonable concession is warranted
where the employer has repeatedly violated section 8 (a) (5) and its opposition to granting checkoff is based solely on a desire to thwart the consummation of a collective bargaining agreement. H.K. Porter Co., 172
N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1968).
The circuit court felt compelled to clarify its original decree because it
disagreed with the Board that the company's interpretation of its obligation was correct. In the court's opinion, the company could not "purge
itself of its bad faith and meet its Section (d) obligation [to bargain collectively] by agreeing simply to negotiate on alternatives to a checkoff."'
For this reason and to establish guidelines for the Board, the clarification
discussed the circumstances under which checkoff could be imposed as a
remedy for bad faith bargaining. These circumstances included the two
violations of section 8(a) (5) and the acknowledgment by the company
that it had no business reason for refusing the checkoff. Thus it would
have been proper for the Board to order the company to grant this provision in return for a reasonable union concession on wages or insurance,
which were the two remaining issues in dispute. In addition, the court
stated that "in an appropriate case the Board could simply order the company to grant a checkoff."'
In Porter two policies of the National Labor Relations Act were in conflict, i.e., freedom of contract and the guarantee of the right of employees
to bargain collectively. The court reasoned that in such a case the Board
must seek the remedy which would best effectuate one of the policies with
the least cost to the other policy. In certain instances, therefore, ordering
an employer to grant checkoff may be the only way to guarantee the employees' right to bargain collectively, regardless of the intrusion into freedom of contract.
4United

5Id.

Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

aid. at 299.
'Id. at 298.
aId. at 300.
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It is significant that the Board in its second order followed the guidance
of the court; it is even more noteworthy that the Board went to the limit
of the judicial directive by not requiring a reasonable concession from the
union. The Board apparently rejected the court's distinction between appropriate cases for an absolute remedy and cases warranting an order of
reciprocal concessions. The basis for this rejection was that "to permit
[the company] to hold out for some 'reasonable concession' by the Union
in return for the checkoff... would imply that the [company] is now being ordered to surrender a position that it had legitimately maintained."'
The Board concluded that such an implication would be contrary to the
finding that the company's opposition was solely designed to thwart the
consummation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Utilization of an absolute order eliminates the confusion which would
have been caused by attempts to distinguish the "appropriate case" mentioned by the court from less extreme cases. Indeed, it is difficult to construct a more extreme example of a section 8 (a) (5) violation than Porter.
Moreover, it is unlikely that a remedy requiring reciprocal concessions
would have been more effective in breaking the cycles of impasse between
the parties, unless the Board has dictated the substance of the union's concession, which would be beyond its statutory authority.
B.A.N.

TaxatiOn - Partnerships
Under Section 119

-

Partner May Be an Employee

Armstrong, manager of the Armstrong Ranch, was provided by the
partnership which owned the ranch with a home for himself and his family, most of his groceries and utilities, maid service, etc. In addition, he received a fixed salary for his services and a share of the partnership profits,
of which he owned a five per cent interest. On his tax returns for the years
1960, 1961, and 1962, Armstrong failed to report the value of the house,
groceries, etc., and the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency for
their value. After paying the deficiency, Armstrong sued for a refund,
contending that these emoluments were properly excluded from his income
under section 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which allows an
employee to exclude the value of meals and lodging furnished by his employer under certain circumstances The Service rejected this contention,
reasoning that a partner cannot be an employee of the partnership. The
district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment.
Held, reversed: Section 707 of the 1954 Code, which permits a partner to
engage in transactions with the partnership as though he were an outsider,
views the partnership as a separate entity, and a partner may be an em9H.K. Porter Co., 68 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1338 (1968).

' The circumstances are if the meals or lodging: (I) is furnished for the convenience of the
employer and (2) is on the business premises of the employer. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, 5 119.
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ployee of this entity, just as he may be its debtor or creditor. Therefore,
the government was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Armstrong v. Phinney, 394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).
Although fought on the battlefield of tax law, Armstrong is a skirmish
in the old dispute over whether a partnership is an "aggregate" of the
ownership interests of the partners, with no separate existence of its own,
or is a separate "entity." Though widespread adoption of the Uniform
Partnership Act in recent years has led to something of a truce on the
question in substantive partnership law, "aggregate" and "entity" are still
fighting words in tax law.' Like the Partnership Act, the Internal Revenue
Code utilizes both theories," but the Code is indefinite on which theory
should govern in several troublesome areas and thus has created some confusion among the courts."
Armstrong illustrates the importance of resolving these uncertainties.
To be entitled to exclude meals and lodging under section 119, the partner
must be an employee of the partnership.' Under the aggregate concept of
partnership, he cannot be an employee, for the partner rendering services
to the partnership is merely serving himself, like a single proprietor running his business. If the partnership is considered an entity, however, the
partner logically can be an employee of this entity, just as a stockholder
can be an employee of his corporation.
Under the 1939 Code the courts of appeals and the Commissioner agreed
that a partner could not exclude from his income the value of meals and
lodging furnished him by the partnership, because the partnership and the
partners were one and the same legal entity." Since no tax was imposed
upon the partnership itself, the courts reasoned that the partnership could
not be regarded as a separate entity for tax purposes." The tax court, however, refused to adopt this reasoning and held instead that the partner
could exclude meals and lodging.'
In 1967 the court of claims decided the first case to arise under the 1954
Code involving exclusion of meals and lodging furnished by a partnership
to a partner.' That court, with little discussion, followed the appellate decisions under the 1939 Code and ruled that the managing partner of a ranch
cannot exclude the value of food and lodging furnished by the partnership
2See 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAw or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION S 35.01 (1957).
' E.g., the imposition of tax on the individual partners rather than on the partnership is an
aggregate approach, whereas the requirement that computations of partnership income and elections
affecting its computation must be made by the partnership reflects the entity concept. Compare
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 701 wth id., § 703.

' Compare Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562, 567-68 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 892 (1948) (tax law adopts the common law concept of the partnership as an aggregate
of individuals) with Commissioner v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383, 385 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948) (Congress adopted the common law view that a partnership was an
entity for most purposes).
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 119.
'Commissioner v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 810 (1959);
United States v. Briggs, 238 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Commissioner v. Doak, 234
F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
'Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704, 708 (4th Cir. 1956).
'E.g., George A. Papineau, 16 T.C. 130 (1951), not acquiesced in, 1952-2 Cum. BuLL. 5.
'Wilson v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 725, 376 F.2d 280 (1967) (per curiam).
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while he lives on the ranch. ' Reasoning that a partnership "is not a legal
entity separate and apart from the partners,"" the court failed to discuss
what effect differences between the 1939 and 1954 codes should have upon
the applicability of previous decisions to cases arising under the 1954 Code.
In Armstrong v. Phinney1" the Fifth Circuit did consider the changes made
by the 1954 Code and in the process departed from the previous decisions.
The court noted that when the 1954 Code was enacted, the entity aspects
of a partnership were more fully recognized than in the 1939 Code by the
addition of section 707, which enables a partner to engage in transactions
with the partnership as though he were an outsider.1 This section permits
the partnership to pay a partner a salary and to deduct it from the partnership income like the salary of any employee."' However, section 707 never
specifically refers to a partner as an employee, and his status as a member
of that category is questionable under other Code provisions.1' Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit ruled that section 707 is sufficient authorization for
judicial recognition of an employer-employee relationship between a partner and his partnership for purposes of section 119.a
Because the appeal was from a summary judgment the scope of the
Armstrong decision is uncertain, for the court's discussion goes no further
than its ruling that the government was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Clearly, the result of the case conflicts with the 1967 court of
claims decision and with decisions of other circuits under the 1939 Code,
but these cases may be distinguishable on their facts. The prior cases which
refused to allow exclusion of meals and lodging have involved partners
owning controlling interests in the partnerships,1' whereas Armstrong owns
only a five per cent interest. Not even under section 707 of the 1954 Code
may a partner owning a fifty per cent interest in the partnership engage in
transactions with the partnership as an outsider." Had Armstrong owned
a larger interest, therefore, the reasoning behind the decision would not
have been available. Thus the case could be read as no more than a recognition by the court that partnerships often grant to employees small
partnership interests even though these mini-partners may have no more
voice in the management and control of the partnership than an employee
without such an interest.
10
11
ld. at 752, 376 F.2d at 296.
125394 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1968).

"'Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (1956) provides:
A partner who engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity
as a partner shall be treated as if he were not a member of the partnership with
respect to such transaction. Such transactions include . . . the rendering of services
by the partnership to the partner or by the partner to the partnership.
Noting the difficulties in this area, the Senate Committee on Finance said in its report: "Because of
its simplicity of operation, the 'entity' rule has been adopted by the House and your committee."
S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954); cf. H.R. RaP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Ses.
59 (1954).
"INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 707(c); see note 13 supra.
'See, e.g., id., % 101(b)(3), 105(g), 401(c), 3121(d).
'a 394 F.2d at 663-64.
"'E.g., Commissioner v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 363 U.S. 810 (1959)
(husband and wife operating hotel as partners); cf. cases cited note 6 supra.
t8iNT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 707(b).
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However, the Fifth Circuit did not discuss fully the countervailing considerations. Although it may be clear that a partnership is considered an
entity under section 707, Congress indicated when it adopted that provision that a partnership cannot be considered an entity in all areas.' Thus
there may well be a distinction between permitting a partner to receive a
salary from the partnership (on which he pays taxes) and permitting him
to exclude from his income the value of meals and lodging furnished by
the partnership. If their value may be excluded, the partner has his living
expenses paid tax-free, and in addition, the tax on his distributive share of
partnership income is reduced, for the partnership is entitled to deduct
the cost of the meals and lodging from the partnership income, thereby
reducing all of the partners' taxable income. This double tax benefit suggests that tax considerations applicable to exclusions from a partner's income should be somewhat different from those applicable to transactions
between the partner and the partnership which result in taxable income
to one or the other.
R.S.S.

In its report on the 1954 Code, the Conference Committee observed:
No inference is intended, however, that a partnership is to be considered as a separate
entity for the purpose of applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws if
the concept of the partnership as a collection of individuals is more appropriate for
such provisions.
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1954). In a footnote the court considered this difficulty and rejected the argument that section 119 is a provision where the aggregate concept is more
appropriate than the entity view. 394 F.2d at 663 n.8. However, the court's rather cursory treatment
of this issue is considerably less than convincing.

